When Nicolás Maduro was removed from power in January 2026, many observers hoped Venezuela had entered a new democratic era. Some political prisoners were released, diplomatic relations improved, and international media began discussing a possible transition.
However, from the perspective of asylum adjudications and country conditions analysis, the key question is not whether Maduro is gone. The critical question is whether the institutions responsible for political persecution have been dismantled.
The evidence suggests they have not.
As a country conditions expert who regularly prepares expert reports and provides testimony in U.S. immigration courts, I continue to receive asylum cases involving Venezuelan opposition activists, journalists, former military personnel, police officers, student leaders, and civil society members. The central issue in many of these cases is whether the removal of Maduro materially changed the risk facing individuals previously targeted by the Venezuelan state.
My assessment is that the risk remains significant for many of these groups.
Delcy Rodríguez Is Not an Opposition Figure
One of the most common misconceptions about post-Maduro Venezuela is the assumption that the current government represents a break from the past.
It does not.
Interim President Delcy Rodríguez was one of the most powerful figures in the Maduro administration. She served as Vice President and occupied senior positions throughout the period during which the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission documented arbitrary detention, torture, persecution, and other serious human rights violations committed by Venezuelan state institutions.
The issue is not merely political affiliation. Rodríguez was part of the governing structure that defended and implemented policies during a period when UN investigators found reasonable grounds to believe crimes against humanity were committed by Venezuelan state actors.
For asylum purposes, this continuity matters.
A change in the person occupying the presidency does not automatically eliminate the risk faced by individuals who were previously targeted by intelligence services, security forces, prosecutors, or pro-government armed groups.
The Repressive Apparatus Remains Intact
Several respected organizations have reached similar conclusions.
According to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Venezuela today shows signs of “authoritarian adaptation” rather than a complete democratic transition. While certain reforms have occurred, the institutions responsible for political control remain largely unchanged.
The judiciary has not undergone meaningful reform. The intelligence services remain operational. Security agencies continue to possess broad powers. Many officials who served under Maduro remain in influential positions. The country has therefore experienced a leadership change without a fundamental transformation of the state apparatus.
When immigration judges evaluate fear of future persecution, they often examine whether country conditions have changed sufficiently to eliminate the risk. In Venezuela’s case, the available evidence suggests that many of the same institutions that targeted political opponents under Maduro continue to operate today.
Political Prisoners Remain in Venezuela
Supporters of the current administration frequently point to the release of political prisoners as evidence of reform. Those releases are important and should be welcomed. However, Amnesty International reported in 2026 that hundreds of political prisoners remained detained despite government promises of liberalization. The organization concluded that arbitrary detention continues to be used against perceived critics and opponents. A government that continues to hold political prisoners cannot be viewed as having fully abandoned the mechanisms of political repression.
Why This Matters for Venezuelan Asylum Cases
Many Venezuelan asylum applicants ask the same question:
“Maduro is gone. Does my case still qualify?”
The answer depends on the individual’s profile.
The removal of Maduro does not erase previous intelligence files, arrest records, surveillance histories, or political classifications maintained by state institutions.
For individuals who were already identified by Venezuelan authorities, the risk assessment must focus on whether the institutions responsible for their persecution still exist.
Conclusion
The international discussion about Venezuela often focuses on personalities.
The asylum analysis should focus on institutions.
Nicolás Maduro is no longer in power, but many of the institutions that enabled political persecution remain active. Delcy Rodríguez’s government represents continuity with the previous political system far more than it represents a democratic break from it.
For immigration attorneys handling Venezuelan asylum cases, country conditions analysis therefore remains essential. The relevant question is not simply whether leadership changed, but whether the applicant’s persecutors lost the ability to target them.
In many cases, the answer remains no.
Dr. Imdat Oner is a Venezuela country conditions expert, political scientist, and former diplomat who prepares expert reports and provides expert testimony in U.S. immigration proceedings involving Venezuelan asylum claims.